

15 MAY 1962

USIB-D-63.6/2

11 May 1962

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Intelligence Required for Counterinsurgency Actions

Attached for information and review are (1) a memorandum from General Carroll forwarding a memorandum from General Krulak to DIA on the subject matter (SACSA-M-79-62, 3 April) and (2) a DIA interim response thereto, dated 4 May. These documents relate to General Taylor's memorandum of 24 April (Attachment to USIB-D-63.6/1) which was considered by USIB on 9 May (USIB-M-213, 9 May, item 5).



Acting Executive Secretary

25X1

Attachments

DIA review(s) completed.

SECRET

SECRET



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.**

3 May 1962

S-4 -

SUBJECT: (U) Intelligence Required for Counterinsurgency

TO: Director of Central Intelligence Agency

Reference: USIB D-63.6/1 of 30 April 1962

1. The attached memorandum from the Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities was forwarded to the Defense Intelligence Agency. It is noted that the requirements therein are identical to those in the reference except for the list of countries for which information is desired.
2. It is requested that this memorandum be considered by the U.S. Intelligence Board in conjunction with the reference to determine how this requirement can best be fulfilled.
3. These requirements can either be met by establishing a special task force to address specifically the studies required or attempt to meet the requirements within the framework of existing programs. There are now in existence intelligence programs capable of providing much of the information required. Modification to increase timeliness, scope and orientation of such programs possibly would suffice to meet the expressed requirements. Specifically, the NIS program, which is designed to provide a comprehensive digest of basic intelligence required by the U. S. Government, might be modified in emphasis to increase its timeliness and oriented sufficiently to fully accommodate this requirement. Alternatively the terms of reference of NIE's and SNIE's could be modified to accommodate these requirements. In support of a disciplined intelligence effort to meet all intelligence needs, it is considered that these requirements should be met within the framework of existing programs expanded if necessary.

Joseph F. Carroll
JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

Atch:
Memo from Office of Special Asst
for Counterinsurgency & Special
Activities

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR
COUNTERINSURGENCY AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

SACSA-M 79-62
3 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: Intelligence Required for Counter-
insurgency Actions

1. Over the years there have been developed specific intelligence requirements essential to prosecution of "hot war" planning and operations. These requirements are fundamentally satisfied by data on the military order of battle, military strength and deployments, evaluation of enemy resources which are capable of contributing to prosecution of war, and estimates of the probable courses of enemy action. US intelligence agencies, by virtue of long experience, are fully conditioned to the production of these data, evaluations, and estimates. It is significant, however, that there is no corresponding treatment identified with counterinsurgency programming and operations, despite the unique nature of the intelligence involved.

2. This deficiency is attributable primarily to the character of counterinsurgency operations, particularly to the very broad base of participation involved. Depending, as it does, upon the coordinate application of diplomatic, military, economic, social, and educational resources, the counterinsurgency task embodies a corresponding need for an intelligence treatment which reflects the coordinate interest of all these diverse sources of power.

3. While there is now no single mechanism which brings all of these intelligence requirements into focus, in the US system, a corresponding lag is not found to exist, at least in equivalent degree, in the intelligence community of our cold war enemy. The Sino-Soviet Bloc is attacking us today, in many areas, through

SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

~~SECRET~~

the medium of subversive insurgency, employing most or all of the coordinate elements described in the preceding paragraph. Furthermore, by virtue of their communist character, they have emphasized the development of "dialectical analysis" which, coupled with great skill at acquiring information from open societies, provide them, as a routine matter, with comprehensive cold war intelligence, covering the whole spectrum of insurgency endeavors. This circumstance accords our cold war enemy a substantial advantage.

4. The enclosure hereto seeks to meet the unfulfilled need discussed above, by bringing together the essential elements of information relating to any country or area in which an insurgency or incipient insurgency exists. It will be seen that all of the items treated are of interest to the political, military, economic, social, and psychological planners who are engaged in developing a coordinated counterinsurgency program. While some of the factors will be of much greater interest to one planner than to another, none can properly be overlooked, since all, taken together, are the essence of counterinsurgency intelligence.

5. It is requested that the attached EEI be considered in the development of a comprehensive counterinsurgency intelligence requirement, and that they be applied to the countries and in the priorities as shown in the appendix hereto.



V. H. Krulak
Major General, USMC

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY ACTIONS

1. WHAT ARE THE PRIMARY DISCONTENTS WITHIN THE COUNTRY-ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY, OR SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL?
 - a. What popular movement, or movements, have developed for the primary purpose of alleviating specific discontents?
 - b. Where are these groups located?
 - c. Are the objectives or interests of these groups contrary to US objectives or interests? How? How can they be influenced?
 - d. What is the present and probable future strength of popular support which is being, or can be, developed in support of alleviation of the discontent?
 - e. Who are the leaders of these groups? Are there interests or objectives contrary to those of the US? How can they be influenced?
 - f. To what extent have the Communists or other pertinent group, gained control of any popular movement designed to alleviate the discontent?
 - g. To what extent can communists or other pertinent groups control or influence non-communist leaders of such a movement?
 - h. What degree of unity exists between groups favoring a seizure or national power?
 - i. What is the present degree of discontent in the country- is it approaching revolutionary intensity?
2. WHAT ARE THE SIGNIFICANT NON-COMMUNIST GROUPS WITHIN THE COUNTRY?
 - a. Are their values, interests or objectives contrary to US objectives and interests? How? How can they be influenced?

SECRET

1

Enclosure

SECRET

- b. What is the present and probable future strength of these factions or groups?
 - c. Who are their leaders, and what are their individual values, interests, or objectives? Are they contrary to US interests or objectives? How? How can they be influenced?
 - d. What degree of unity presently exists among the groups opposing a seizure of national power?
 - e. Where are these groups located?
 - f. To what extent are these groups or their leaders influenced or controlled by the communists or other pertinent group or nation? How?
3. WHICH PERTINENT GROUPS AND WHICH PERTINENT INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE COUNTRY ARE ALLIES AND WHICH ARE ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL ENEMIES? WHY?
- a. Under what circumstances can these relationships change?
4. WHAT IS THE COMPARATIVE MILITARY AND/OR PARAMILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE PERTINENT GROUPS WITHIN THE COUNTRY?
- a. What is the military and/or paramilitary manpower, equipment, materiel, and probable effectiveness of the various groups?
 - b. Where is the manpower, equipment, and materiel of the various groups located?
 - c. What portion of the country's regular military capability will support the various groups?
5. HOW STRONG IS THE COMMUNIST PARTY?
- a. What positions of influence do Communists or Communist pawns hold in the government? How can they be controlled, influenced, or removed?

SECRET

SECRET

6. FROM A COLD WAR STANDPOINT WHO ARE THE SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENTIAL PERSONS IN THE POLICE, MILITARY, PUBLIC INFORMATION MEDIA, INTELLIGENCE, FINANCE, TRANSPORTATION, POWER INDUSTRIES, AND GOVERNMENT?
 - a. Why are they significantly influential?
 - b. Are their Motivations or actions contrary to US interests or objectives? How?
 - c. To what extent are any of these men influenced or controlled by the Communists or other pertinent group or nation?
 - d. How can they be influenced or controlled?
7. WHAT ARE THE INTERNAL WEAKNESSES OF THE COUNTRY-ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY, OR SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL?
 - a. Which of these weaknesses, if exploited to the optimum degree, could provide the communists or other pertinent groups, with a significant increase in power? How significant?
 - b. To what extent are the communists or other pertinent group, presently exploiting this weakness, or weaknesses?
8. WHAT ARE THE SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL STRENGTHS OF THE COUNTRY-MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, OR SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL?
 - a. To what extent are the communists or other pertinent group undermining these strengths? How?
9. APPROXIMATELY WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE COUNTRY'S EXISTING INSTITUTIONS AND LEADERS?
10. WHAT ARE THE SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL STRENGTHS OF THE COUNTRY-MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, OR SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL?
 - a. To what extent are the communists or other pertinent group undermining these strengths? How?

SECRET

SECRET

11. WHAT ARE THE SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL WEAKNESSES OF THE COUNTRY--
ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL?
12. WHAT IS THE CUSTOMARY WAY, OR WAYS, FOR THE PEOPLE TO EX-
PRESS THEIR DISCONTENT AGAINST AUTHORITY? OR WHAT ARE THE
CUSTOMARY FORMS OF STRUGGLE.
 - a. What form or forms of struggle are being used at
this time?
 - b. What is the probable sequence of events in utilizing
this form or forms of struggle?
 - c. If no form of struggle is being utilized at this time,
what form or forms are most likely to be used in the
future?
 - d. What is the probable form of struggle and sequence of
events that would be utilized in the final phase of
an attempted seizure of power?
 - e. What are the most likely alternate forms of struggle
that would be used during the final phase of an
attempted seizure of power with their most likely
sequence of events?
 - f. What are the communists or other pertinent groups,
present and future abilities to achieve the sequential
objectives in the most probable sequence of events
during both the preliminary and the final phase of
attempts to seize power?
13. WOULD AN INTERNAL OR PERTINENT EXTERNAL ECONOMIC, POLITICAL,
MILITARY, OR SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL CRISIS OR OTHER ACTION
SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE THE COMMUNIST OR OTHER PERTINENT
GROUPS' CHANCES OF ACHIEVING THEIR OBJECTIVES? WHAT AND HOW?
14. WHAT ARE THE VITAL, AND GENERAL, NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY
OBJECTIVES?
 - a. What significant political, economic, military or
socio-psychological actions are being taken to achieve
these objectives?
 - b. What are their potential capabilities for achieving
these objectives?

SECRET

4

Enclosure

SECRET

15. WHAT ARE OTHER PERTINENT NATIONS' OR GROUPS' VALUES, INTERESTS OR OBJECTIVES WHICH MAY OR DO AFFECT THE COUNTRY? HOW?
 - a. What actions are they taking or likely to take in furthering their values, interest, or objectives?
 - b. What is the likely sequence of these actions?
16. IS THE CURRENT AREA OR WORLD SITUATION CONDUCTIVE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OR COMMUNIST OR OTHER PERTINENT GROUPS' OBJECTIVES?
 - a. Do they possess a pertinent area, or global superiority of power?
 - b. To what extent are their available forces committed?
 - c. What is the pertinent disposition of area or world public opinion?
17. WHAT ACTIVITIES OR SITUATIONS WITHIN THE COUNTRY ARE ERODING UNITED STATES PRESTIGE, INFLUENCE, OR PREROGATIVES?
 - a. If US military forces or activities are located within the country - what activities or situations are eroding US military capabilities?

SECRET

5

Enclosure

SECRET

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE

1. Critical Countries - Category "A" (Priority I)

Afghanistan	Laos
Berlin ✓	Pakistan
Cambodia	Republic of the Congo
Cuba ✓	South Vietnam
Dominican Republic	Thailand

2. Potentially Critical Countries "B" (Priority II)

Albania ✓	Honduras
Algeria ✓	Indonesia
Bolivia	Iran
Burma	Iraq
Brazil	Mali
Colombia	Mexico
East Germany ✓	Morocco ✓
Ecuador	Portugal ✓
Egypt	South Korea
El Salvador	Syria
France ✓	Taiwan ✓
Ghana	Turkey
Guatemala	Venezuela
Guinea ✓	West Germany ✓
Haiti	

✓ - not on Gen. Tafari list

SECRET

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

4 MAY 1962

S-6

SUBJECT: (U) Intelligence Required for Counterinsurgency Actions

TO: Chairman, U.S. Intelligence Board

Reference: Director, DIA letter "Intelligence Required for Counterinsurgency Actions" dated 3 May 1962

1. Reference forwarded to the Director, CIA a letter from the Office of Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, outlining the intelligence required for counterinsurgency actions. Further, the U.S. Intelligence Board was requested to consider means of meeting these requirements.

2. Attachment is a copy of a letter I have forwarded to the Office of Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities as an interim reply to his stated requirements.

S. B. Frankel

S. B. FRANKEL
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff /

1 Atch
Ltr to Office of Special Asst
for Counterinsurgency and Special
Activities w/2 atchs

DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES
LINEAR RECORDING SYSTEM
DD FORM 100-10

SECRET

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.



4 MAY 1962

S-5

SUBJECT: (U) Intelligence Required for Counterinsurgency Actions

TO: Office of Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and
Special Activities

References: a. SACSA-M 79-62 of 3 April 1962 -
b. USIB D-63.6/1 of 30 April 1962

1. Your letter, reference a, is acknowledged. It has been carefully studied and will be utilized as guidance in the continuing programs to provide the essential intelligence requirements for your planning. Specifically, actions that are being contemplated are enumerated in paragraphs 4 and 5.
2. You provided a list of essential elements of information for counterinsurgency actions and stated that all the items covered were of interest to the political, military, economic, social and psychological planners engaged in developing a coordinated counterinsurgency program. I concur in your analysis that the counterinsurgency task embodies a corresponding need for an intelligence treatment which reflects the coordinate interest of all these diverse sources of power. In fact any program, whether it be political, military, economic, or counterinsurgency which does not take into consideration all factors of national power of the area involved is not initiated on a realistic basis. These factors include the ones you mentioned and others which are addressed in our national intelligence programs.
3. As a preliminary to describing the actions which DIA proposes to take, I would like to outline the continuing national intelligence programs which are designed to provide the types of information which you listed as essential. These programs are the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) program, the National Intelligence Estimates (NIE), Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE) and the recently instituted Weekly Survey of Cold War Crisis Situations.
 - a. The NIS program is designed to provide a comprehensive digest of the basic intelligence required for the U.S. Government. It should serve fully the basic intelligence requirements of the Department of Defense in strategic and high level operational planning, also the needs at lower planning and operational levels in the Armed Forces. This program has provided initial coverage of about 85 percent of the world at the present. The "Standard Instructions for the NIS" provide a detailed description

DECLASSIFIED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS;

DECLASSIFIED AND APPROVED FOR RELEASE 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100120012-9

DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

SECRET

of what can be found in the NIS. Enclosure 1 contains a list of the countries you listed as priority I and II with a corresponding indication of whether Chapter I has been produced and when. Chapter I is a Country Brief of all the chapters contained in the NIS. The chapters on Sociological, Political, and Economic particularly relate to your questions. For example, there are sections which cover actual or potential subversive threats by groups; their influence in national or local affairs and their ability to effect U.S. interest; economic and political policies and resulting attitudes; and discussions of Communist subversive activities within and directed against the country.

b. In enclosure 2, you will find a list by country showing NIE's and SNIE's which have been prepared and the date. While these estimates do not address all of your questions, they do address many. The terms of reference for preparing these studies determine the scope of the coverage.

c. The recently instituted "Weekly Survey of Cold War Crisis Situations" will be useful in alerting you to situations in which you might become involved. The Survey deals with a grey area between current intelligence and national estimates. It is in effect, a vehicle for the coordination and dissemination of brief judgments of import to top officials concerning foreseeable crisis situations or significant changes in existing situations. Depending on needs, these may or may not be followed by more deliberate estimative studies in depth through the NIE or SNIE process.

4. Essentially then, there are now in existence intelligence programs capable of providing much of the information you require. These programs are presently committed and any extensive deviation would cause degradation. However, modifications to increase timeliness, scope and orientation would accommodate your requirements. It is primarily to this area that we propose to address our efforts with the following contemplated actions:

a. The NIS Program. As you know, DIA Production Center, which will have the responsibility for the military aspects of this publication, is still in the planning stage. However, careful consideration is being given to the military program in the NIS area to make it more responsive to users needs. Specifically, consideration is being given to increasing Chapter I production from a level of 12 a year to 18 or more per year. Since this chapter essentially summarizes information on all factors of a nation's power including those in which you expressed interest, information from a basic intelligence standpoint would be maintained more up-to-date and the few countries which have not as yet had initial coverage could be scheduled.

b. The NIE, SNIE Program. The countries and areas you listed as

SECRET

SECRET

priority I and II have mostly been addressed by the Board of National Estimates. However, some of the specific questions of interest have not been addressed. Consequently, your list of questions will be available for use in developing the terms of reference for future NIE's and SNIE's that are produced. In this way, the scope of these studies can more fully meet your requirements for judgments of an estimative nature.

5. Further, a list of questions similar to your list has also been forwarded to the U.S. Intelligence Board by General Taylor, USIB D-63.6/1 of 30 April. This subject will be addressed by the USIB on 9 May 1962 in an effort to determine any other possible means of providing the type of intelligence required by counterinsurgency planners. Your office will be kept informed of actions taken by the U.S. Intelligence Board and progress made in meeting your requirements.

S. B. Frankel

S. B. FRANKEL
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff

2 Atch

1. NIS Chapter I Status on Certain Countries
2. NIE, SNIE Production on Certain Countries

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

NIS Chapter I Status on Certain Countries

Country	Published		Schedules		Forecast	
	Chapter I	Updated	FY62	FY63	FY64	FY65
Afghanistan	Oct 1960					
Albania	Feb 1959					M
Algeria						I
Bolivia						
Brazil					I	
Burma	Jan 1961					
Cambodia	Jan 1960					
Colombia			I			
Congo						
Cuba						
Dominican Rep.						
East Germany	Apr 1959					M
Ecuador					I	
Egypt	Oct 1955	Feb 1960		M		
El Salvador						
France	May 1957	May 1959			M	
Ghana						
Guatemala						
Guiana						
Haiti						
Honduras						
Indonesia			I			
Iran	Jan 1954	Mar 1959		M		
Iraq	Oct 1957	Sep 1959			M	
Laos	Feb 1960					
Mali						
Mexico				I		
Morocco	Mar 1958	Nov 1960				M
Pakistan	Aug 1956	Feb 1959	M			
Portugal	Feb 1956	Oct 1959		M		
South Korea	Sep 1958			M		
South Vietnam	Apr 1960					
Syria	May 1956	Feb 1960				
Taiwan	Aug 1957	Apr 1960			M	
Thailand	Jan 1955	Oct 1958	M			
Turkey	Feb 1957	Sep 1958			M	
Venezuela	Jun 1961					
West Germany	May 1959					M

M - Maintenance/complete rewrite and update
 I - Initial publication planned

The above reflects the fact that Chapter I production to date has been concentrated on NIS areas to which the JCS had assigned high priority. With respect to Chapter I production after FY62, the NIS Committee currently has under consideration an increase in the production rate of Chapters I from the FY62 level of 12 to approximately 18 per year. Realization of this increase would significantly increase the production rate of Chapters I.

CONFIDENTIAL

ATL

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100120012-9

Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100120012-9